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Singapore has developed its own unique state-driven housing system, with more than three quarters of its 
housing stock built by the Housing and Development Board and homeownership financed through Central 
Provident Fund savings. As a result, it has one of the highest homeownership rates amongst market 
economies. This paper provides a historical perspective of the main housing problems faced by successive 
prime ministers and their respective policy responses. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Lee Kuan 
Yew (1959-1990), the government established an integrated land-housing supply and housing finance 
framework to channel much needed resources into the housing sector to deal with a chronic housing 
shortage. Under Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong (1990-2004), asset enhancement schemes to renew aging 
estates as well as market deregulation measures were implemented. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong 
(2004-present) has been confronted with a different set of challenges—investment demand for housing, 
rising inequalities and rapidly aging population. These problems have brought about the introduction of 
carefully crafted macroprudential policies, targeted housing grants to assist low and middle income 
households, and schemes to help elderly households monetize their housing equity.  
Keywords: Singapore, housing policies, housing finance 
1. Introduction  
In the five decades since independence, Singapore has developed its own unique housing system, with 
76% of the 2013 housing stock built by the Housing and Development Board (HDB), a statutory board 
established in 1960. In 1968, the Singapore government introduced a significant housing policy 
innovation when Central Provident Fund (CPF) savings were allowed to be used for down payment and 
mortgage payments for HDB flats. As a result, 87% of the resident population lived in HDB housing 
and the homeownership rate had increased to 88% by 1990 — one of the highest rates amongst market 
economies. The HDB–CPF framework established in the 1960s has transformed the urban form of 
Singapore and remains largely intact for five decades. The housing challenges confronting each 
government have however evolved over the years. Singapore’s three prime ministers since 
independence each faced a different set of housing problems during their terms and responded with a 
different set of housing policies.  
This paper provides a historical perspective of the main housing problems faced by each prime 
minister and the respective policy responses. Section 2 provides an overview of the integrated land-
housing supply and financing framework established by the government of Prime Minister Lee Kuan 
Yew in the 1960s to channel resources into the housing sector. Section 3 presents the challenges of 
renewing aging estates and creating a market for HDB flats in the 1990s under the government of Prime 
Minister Goh Chok Tong. Section 4 describes the housing challenges faced by Prime Minister Lee 
Hsien Loong — speculative and investment housing demand, rising inequalities and an aging 
population. These have brought about the introduction of carefully crafted macro-prudential policies, 
targeted housing grants to assist low and middle income households, and schemes to help elderly 
                                                     
* This paper draws from Phang (2007, 2013a, 2013b) as well as unpublished papers prepared for the World Bank in 2010, the Asian 
Development Bank in 2011, and the World Bank Institute and Korea Development Institute in 2013. In particular, I thank Dr Loic Chiquier 
of the World Bank for discussions on the problems encountered in countries where governments have adopted or adapted various 
components of Singapore’s housing policies 
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households monetize their housing equity. Section 5 concludes with observations on the limited 
transferability of Singapore’s housing model.  
2. The Lee Kuan Yew Government, 1959–1990: Laying the Foundations  
Mr. Lee Kuan Yew’s government is to be credited with laying the foundations for the successful 
economic development of Singapore in the 1960s. The political turbulence from self-government, 
merger with Malaysia, and unexpected independence was not conducive to attracting long term 
investments. On the housing front, the government was faced with a largely immigrant and growing 
population, a chronic housing shortage as well as insufficient private sector resources and capacity to 
provide adequate solutions.  
The Singapore Improvement Trust (SIT), a statutory board created by the colonial government in 
1927, had been established as a town planning authority and also undertook road construction and 
general improvement of the city. In 1932, the housing shortage led the government to expand the SIT’s 
responsibilities to include the provision of houses and flats for lower income groups. By 1941, SIT had 
completed construction of only some 2000 dwellings.1  
In the post-war period, the SIT stepped up building activity between 1947 and 1959, building an 
estimated 21,000 housing units. SIT dwellings housed 8.8% of the population by 1959; a majority of 
the population resided in overcrowded pre-war shophouses, or slums and tenements without piped water 
and modern sanitation. Given the appalling overcrowding, the newly elected government took upon 
itself the task of providing homes on a large scale. In the 1960s, the foundations of Singapore’s real 
estate and housing policies were put in place. Three important components of these were the 
establishment of the HDB in 1960, the enactment of the Land Acquisition Act (LAA) in 1966 and the 
expansion of the role of the CPF to become a housing finance institution in 1968.  
 
2.1. 1960: The Housing and Development Board  
The HDB began operations on 1 February 1960. It replaced the SIT and was set up as a statutory board 
to provide “decent homes equipped with modern amenities for all those who needed them”. A target of 
110,000 dwelling units to be built was set for 1960–1970. From 1964, the HDB began offering housing 
units for sale on 99-year leasehold basis, under its “Home Ownership for the People” scheme.2 HDB 
priced housing units affordably for households with incomes not exceeding S$800 a month, and offered 
loans such that owners paid less in monthly mortgage payments than they would have done in rents.  
The political and economic motivations for homeownership policies are perhaps best understood in 
the words of the then Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew:  
My primary preoccupation was to give every citizen a stake in the country and its 
future. I wanted a home-owning society. I had seen the contrast between the blocks of 
low-cost rental flats, badly misused and poorly maintained, and those of house-proud 
owners, and was convinced that if every family owned its home, the country would be 
more stable…I had seen how voters in capital cities always tended to vote against the 
government of the day and was determined that our householders should become 
homeowners, otherwise we would not have political stability. My other important 
motive was to give all parents whose sons would have to do national service a stake 
in the Singapore their sons had to defend. If the soldier’s family did not own their 
home, he would soon conclude he would be fighting to protect the properties of the 
wealthy. I believed this sense of ownership was vital for our new society which had 
no deep roots in a common historical experience (Lee, 2000, pp. 116–117).  
 
                                                     
1 See Phang (1992), Chapter 3 for a description of the SIT and other public sector agencies involved in housing development in the 1960s 
and 1970s 
2 Phang (1992) and the HDB website at http://www.hdb.gov.sg 
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2.2. 1966: Government land acquisition  
The most striking feature of the land system in Singapore is the prevalence of government landholding 
and the leasehold as a method of land holding.3 More than 90% of land in Singapore belongs to the state 
and much of the real estate in Singapore is therefore built on land leased from the state. Land scarcity 
in Singapore has been used to justify extensive state land ownership and the need for judicious 
allocation of scarce land by the land use planner among various competing uses. In 1966 the government 
enacted the LAA which permitted the state and its agencies to acquire land for any public purpose, for 
any work or an undertaking which is of public benefit or of public utility or in the public interest; or for 
any residential, commercial or industrial purposes. Thus, the government was and is still empowered to 
acquire sufficient land from private land owners to develop new public housing flats.  
A 1973 amendment set payments independent of market conditions and the landowner’s purchase 
price. Between 1973 and 1987, compensation for acquired land was assessed at the market value as at 
30 November, 1973 or the date of gazette notification whichever was lower. The existence of rent 
control further depressed land values for affected properties. Government land acquisition at 
compensation rates below market values in the 1970s greatly facilitated the industrialization and 
housing programs. State ownership of land grew from 44% in 1960 to 76% by 1985. This dramatic 
increase was achieved through a combination of land acquisition, land reclamation4 and the transfer of 
British military land.  
Subsidiary legislation in the form of State Land Rules 1968 provided that titles for state-owned land 
should be for terms not exceeding 99 years. Through the LAA, the government cleared low density 
housing, slums, villages and squatter areas, and assembled land parcels. State land was leased to 
government agencies for the development of “public” housing which was sold on a 99 year leasehold 
basis to eligible households, and for the development of industrial estates. Subsequent amendments to 
the Act from 1987 changed the statutory date used for pegging compensation which is currently at 
market rates.  
Public land leasing generally goes under the term Government Land Sales (GLS). Much urban 
redevelopment in Singapore has been achieved through the GLS program administered mainly by the 
Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) and to a smaller extent — the HDB. Under the program, the 
government amalgamates land, inserts infrastructure, provides planning and urban design guidelines, 
and releases the land for sale to private (including foreign) developers. Sites are usually sold on 99-year 
leases for commercial, hotel and private residential development, whereas leases for industrial sites are 
usually for 60 years or less. The lease tenure for other types of sites varies depending on the use. The 
usual sale method is through public tender.  
2.3. 1968: Mobilization of provident fund savings for housing finance  
While HDB and related construction finance and land policy brought about a transformation on the 
housing supply side, demand for homeownership was “created” by directing savings in the CPF towards 
housing.5 The CPF had been in existence before the HDB, having been established as a pension plan in 
1955 by the colonial government to provide social security for the working population in Singapore. 
The scheme required contributions by both employers and employees, respectively, of a certain 
percentage of the individual employee’s monthly salary toward the employee’s personal and portable 
account in the fund. All employers are required to contribute monthly to the fund. The bulk of 
contributions can only be withdrawn for specific purposes (of which housing dominates), at age 55, or 
on permanent in capacitation of the contributor concerned.  
The CPF became an important institution for financing homeownership from September 1968 when 
legislation was enacted to allow withdrawals from the fund to finance the purchase of housing sold by 
the HDB and subsequently sold by other public sector agencies as well. The contribution rates for 
employees at the inception of the CPF in 1955 were five % of the monthly salary for employees and 
                                                     
3 Phang (1992), Chapter 2; Phang (1996); Center for Liveable Cities (2014) 
4 Land reclamation works have increased the land area of Singapore since 1965 by more than one fifth (see Table 1). The government 
amended legislation (Foreshores Act) to allow foreshore reclamation works to be undertaken without being subject to claims for loss of 
shoreline 
5 Detailed information can be found at the CPF website: http://www.cpf.gov.sg. 
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five % for employers. From 1968, the rates were adjusted upward and peaked at 25% of wages for both 
employers and employees from 1984 to 1986 (see Figure 1). Contribution rates are currently 20% of 
wages for Singapore citizen employees and 17% of wages for employers, up to a salary ceiling of $5000. 
Contribution rates are lower for workers above 50 years of age, and the proportion of contributions 
allocated for investments, retirement, and healthcare also varies with age. Rates have varied depending 
on economic conditions and changes to contribution rates have been previously used as a 
macroeconomic stabilization instrument to limit inflation or to reduce wage cost.  
The interest rate on CPF Ordinary Account savings is based on a weighted average of 1-year fixed 
deposit and month-end savings rates of the local banks, subject to a minimum of 2.5% (the current rate). 
Savings in the Special, Medisave and Retirement accounts earn additional interest of 1.5 percentage 
points above the normal CPF interest rate (currently 4%).  
Between 1968 and 1981, CPF savings could only be withdrawn for purposes of downpayment, stamp 
duties, mortgage and interest payments incurred for the purchase of public-sector-built housing. In 
1981, the scheme was extended to allow for withdrawals for mortgage payments for the purchase of 
private housing. From 1984, rules governing the use of CPF savings have been gradually liberalized to 
allow for withdrawals for medical and education expenses, insurance, and investments in various 
financial assets.  
The HDB provides mortgage loans and mortgage insurance to purchasers of its leasehold flats (both 
new and resale). The loan ceiling is 90% of the price of the flat and the maximum repayment period is 
25 years.6 The mortgage interest rate charged by the HDB is pegged at 0.1 percentage points above the 
CPF ordinary account savings interest rate which in turn is based on savings rates offered by the 
commercial banks, subject to a minimum of 2.5%. The HDB is a recipient of government loans to 
finance its mortgage lending, interest of which is pegged to the prevailing CPF savings rate. The 
mortgage lending rate charged by the HDB to homeowners is 0.1 percentage point higher than the rate 
that it borrows from the government, thus ensuring the sustainability of the financing arrangement. A 
schematic view of how housing is financed in Singapore is shown in Figure 2.  
CPF collects member contributions and invests these in special non-tradable government securities 
that earn the same interest that it pays out to its members: 2.5% and 4%. Each household is eligible to 
apply twice for new HDB flats (the second application after 10 years of occupying the first, and subject 
to eligibility conditions) and two loans from the HDB. Housing loans for private housing are provided 
by commercial banks and finance houses. Housing loans for public housing have also been provided by 
commercial banks since 2003. With the decline in mortgage interest rates in recent years, commercial 
                                                     
6 For resale flats, the loan ceiling is 90% of the resale price or 90% of the market value, whichever is lower. The maximum loan repayment 
period is 65 years minus the buyer’s age or 25 years, whichever is shorter. Monthly installments are capped at 30% of the purchaser’s gross 
monthly income. See HDB’s website for other terms and conditions at: 
http://www.hdb.gov.sg/fi10/fi10321p.nsf/w/HLHDBWhat?OpenDocument.  
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banks have been able to offer loans at rates below the HDB loans’ 2.6% interest floor and have been 
increasing their share of mortgage lending.  
2.4. Outcomes of housing policy  
Improvements in the urban environment and the standards of housing in Singapore over the next three 
decades provided very tangible and visible evidence of the success of the economic development and 
housing strategy adopted by the Singapore government. This overwhelming success has been well 
documented. Land and properties in the city and rural areas were acquired by the government. Squatter 
settlements were cleared. Entire neighborhoods and villages were resettled in HDB new towns. HDB’s 
housing stock increased rapidly from 120,138 units in 1970 to 574,443 units in 1990, housing 87% of 
the resident population (see Table 1). The homeownership rate for the resident population increased 
from 29% in 1970 to 88% by 1990. Singapore’s large public housing sector is therefore in ownership 
terms, a largely privatized sector. However, ownership tenure of a HDB dwelling differs in many 
aspects from ownership of a private dwelling. Ownership rights are limited by numerous regulations 
concerning eligibility conditions for purchase, resale, subletting and housing loans.  
The housing market is highly segmented according to regulations on eligibility of households. Only 
citizen households are eligible for HDB rental and direct purchase (one unit per household), with current 
monthly gross household income caps at S$1,500 for rental and S$10,000 for direct purchase, 
respectively. The resale HDB sector is open to citizens and permanent residents, with housing grants 
for purchaser households carefully calibrated according to citizenship, marital status and household 
income. The private housing sector caters largely to higher income Singapore citizens, permanent 
residents, expatriates, and foreign investors. Foreign ownership of housing is largely confined to the 
private flats and condominiums sector.7 
That a large public housing program could deliver satisfactory housing for the majority in a relatively 
affluent city testifies to the production efficiency and responsiveness to changes of the Singapore 
government. This public provision of a private good on a large scale was accompanied by numerous 
regulations on eligibility, resale and financing, which in the earlier decades resulted in some 
consumption inefficiencies. The public-private hybrid model has however allowed the government to 
regulate, deregulate and re-regulate the sector with changes in socio-economic as well as market 
conditions.  
                                                     
7 Under the Residential Property Act, foreigners including permanent residents who wish to purchase landed housing have to obtain prior 
approval from the Minister for Law. If approval is granted, the foreigner or PR is required to use the property for residence only and not for 
rental or other income-generating purposes. A minimum occupation period of five years and limitation of ownership to only one landed 
house applies. From 2004, the rule was relaxed for Sentosa Cove landed homes. 8 See Phang (2007) for details. 
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Favorable socio-economic effects of Singapore’s housing welfare approach include the following8:  
(i) Increase in savings rate  
At the inception of the CPF home ownership scheme in 1968, the Gross National Saving to GNP ratio 
was less than 20% and insufficient to fund the country’s investment needs (32% of GNP). The CPF 
contributed to a significant leap in the savings rate to 44% of GNP by 1990 (see Table 1) — certainly 
one of the highest savings rate in the world and more than sufficient to meet the country’s investment 
needs.  
(ii) Increase in quantity and quality of housing stock  
The housing welfare approach enabled Singapore to mobilize long term resources on the demand side 
to finance the rapid supply of housing by the public sector with minimal involvement of government 
expenditure. Although Krugman (1994) has rather critically described Singapore’s economic 
development as “a mobilization of resources that would have done Stalin proud”, in the housing sector, 
it was a mobilization of resources that visibly raised the living standards of the entire population, 
transformed the built environment of Singapore and resulted in the creation of significant housing and 
real estate wealth.  
(iii) Increase in homeownership rate  
The development of well-functioning mortgage markets though desirable in itself is often viewed as a 
means to achieving a higher homeownership rate. Homeownership is promoted in many countries and 
various policies and institutional arrangements exist to provide incentives for homeownership by 
reducing its costs relative to renting (Phang, 2013a). In addition to government provision of affordable 
subsidized HDB housing and HDB mortgage loans, the policy of allowing high mandatory savings to 
be used for home purchase and not rental made homeownership the dominant option for almost all 
Singaporean households. Not surprising, and given sustained income increases and low unemployment 
rates, the homeownership rate for the resident population increased from 29% in 1970 to 88% by 1990 
(see Table 1).  
(iv) Development of the mortgage sector  
Housing policy has contributed in a major way to the development of the mortgage sector in Singapore. 
In 1970, shortly after the implementation of the CPF Approved Housing Scheme, outstanding housing 
loans were a mere S$215 million, constituting only 4% of GNP. By 1990, the housing loans to GNP 
ratio had increased to 29%, with the HDB share at 54% (see Table 1).  
(v) Racial integration  
The large HDB housing sector has played an extremely important role in the shaping of Singapore 
society. Singapore is a multi-racial multi-religious country; in 2013, the Chinese majority comprised 
74.2% of the resident population, Malays 13.3%, Indians 9.1%, with other races comprising 3.3%. The 
physical plans of HDB new towns have been designed to integrate the various income and racial groups 
within the public housing program, and this has prevented the development of low-income or ethnic 
ghettos. The colonial administration had in its early days of town planning, followed a policy of racial 
segregation. Beginning in the 1970s, the HDB allocated new flats in a manner that would give a “good 
distribution of races” to different new towns. However, by 1988, a trend of ethnic regrouping through 
the resale market, was highlighted as a housing problem which would lead to the re-emergence of ethnic 
enclaves. In 1989, the HDB implemented an Ethnic Integration Policy under which racial limits were 
set for HDB neighborhoods. When the set racial limits for a neighborhood is reached, those wishing to 
sell their HDB flats in the particular neighborhood had to sell it to another household of the same ethnic 
group. The government had emphasized that “our multiracial policies must continue if we are to develop 
a more cohesive, better integrated society. Singapore’s racial harmony, long term stability, and even 
viability as a nation depend on it” (Ooi et al., 1993, p. 14).  
 
                                                     
8 See Phang (2007) for details. 
Singapore’s Housing Policies: Responding to the Challenges of Economic Transitions 
 
7 
(ii)  
  
(vi) Impact on economic distribution  
The vast majority of households including low income households in Singapore have benefited from 
access to ownership of affordable public housing. The active resale market allows for mobility within 
and out of the market and for the benefits of price discounts to be capitalized after a minimum 
Singapore’s Housing Policies: Responding to the Challenges of Economic Transitions 
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occupancy period. Each household is allowed to apply twice for a “housing subsidy” that has been 
described as “a ticket to an easier life for the HDB heartlander” (The Straits Times, 19 April 1997).  
Given the massive program, trade-offs were inevitable. The housing approach adopted in Singapore 
undoubtedly increased savings and homeownership rates, mobilized resources for the housing sector 
and contributed to an increase in housing loans and development of the primary mortgage market. 
However, the approach is not without its detractors. Singapore’s housing strategy is inherently policy 
driven and centrally controlled, with major decisions on savings rate, savings allocation, land use, 
housing production, and housing prices being largely determined by the government. Pugh (1985), in 
the context of providing a set of operating guidelines for a good housing system, and advocating 
Singapore’s strategy as a good model, writes:  
…do not be too perturbed if some orthodox (neo-classical) economists argue that 
housing is over-allocated by subsidy. Show them that ‘subsidy’ is a concept which 
cannot be fitted easily to housing, and produce counter arguments, which are 
respectable in economics, and which are readily available.  
3. The Goh Government, 1990–2004: Market Deregulation and Asset Enhancement  
When Mr. Goh Chok Tong succeeded Mr. Lee Kuan Yew as Prime Minister in 1990, the housing 
shortage problem had been solved. With 88% of households owning their own homes, 87% in HDB 
flats, the property-owning democracy had become a reality. In the 1990s, the HDB shifted its focus to 
providing larger and better quality flats for existing HDB and upper-middle income households, 
redevelopment of older estates, and retrofitting existing flats. Upgrading by households to larger flats 
within the HDB sector has been facilitated by the development of an active secondary market and a 
system that allowed an eligible household to apply for a second (usually larger) subsidized flat after a 
minimum occupation period.  
The land planning focus in the early 1990s correspondingly shifted to one that was more visionary 
and which provided a larger market space for private sector developers to meet the aspirations of a 
growing segment of the population for more exclusive housing. This was the period when government 
land sales to private developers resulted in a marked increase in the supply of private housing. Revenue 
from sale of state land leases constituted a significant proportion of government revenue, particularly 
during the “boom” years of the 1990s.  
Housing policy under Goh Chok Tong’s term as Prime Minister was marked by market deregulation, 
“asset enhancement” and “upgrading” policies. The Goh government came to view Singaporean homes 
as an asset and potential source of security for their old age (Centre for Liveable Cities and HDB, 2013, 
p. 15). Policies implemented included deregulation of the HDB resale market including housing loans 
for HDB resale flats which facilitated mobility, physical upgrading of HDB flats and neighborhoods, 
and the introduction of demand side subsidies in the form of CPF housing grants. These policies partly 
contributed to the rapid escalation of housing prices in the early half of the 1990s.  
3.1. Resale market deregulation  
The desirability of any asset is determined to a large extent by its liquidity, while ease of trade 
determines the efficiency of a market. The promotion of ownership of subsidized new HDB dwellings 
was therefore accompanied by policies concerning the secondary market for that housing. From the 
perspective of public policy, there was early concern that given the then general housing shortage, HDB 
dwellings should not become a vehicle for speculation by allowing the price subsidies to be capitalized 
on a secondary market. Resale regulations were therefore extremely onerous in the early days of the 
housing program. With the easing of the housing shortage, the HDB housing sector was ready for 
deregulation.  
Prior to 1971, there was no resale market for owner-occupied HDB dwellings. HDB required owners 
who wished to sell their flats to return them to the HDB at the original purchase price plus the 
depreciated cost of improvements. In 1971, a resale market was created when the HDB allowed owners 
who had resided in their flats for a minimum of three years to sell their flats at market prices to buyers 
Singapore’s Housing Policies: Responding to the Challenges of Economic Transitions 
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of their choice who satisfied the HDB eligibility requirements for homeownership. However, these 
households were debarred from applying for public housing for a year.  
The debarment period was increased to two and a half years in 1975. The minimum occupancy 
period before resale was increased to five years in 1973 and has remained in place since. The debarment 
period, a great deterrent for any household considering sale of its dwelling, was abolished in 1979 
thereby greatly facilitating exchanges within the public housing sector. This was replaced by a five 
percent levy on the transacted price of the dwelling to “reduce windfall profits”. A graded resale levy 
based on flat type was introduced in 1982, and rules regarding circumstances under which levies could 
be waived were fine-tuned in the 1980s. The resale levy system ensures that the subsidy on the second 
new flat purchased by the household from the HDB is smaller than that for the first time HDB flat 
buyer.  
Only citizens, non-owners of any other residential property, households with a minimum size of two 
persons with household incomes below the income ceiling set by the HDB were eligible to purchase 
new or resale HDB flats prior to 1989. In 1989, residential mobility was enhanced when the income 
ceiling restriction was removed for HDB resale flats; the resale market was opened to permanent 
residents as well as private property owners who had to owner-occupy their HDB flat. HDB flat-owners 
who could not own any other residential property before, could also invest in private sector built 
dwellings. From 1991, single citizens above the age of 35 have been allowed to purchase HDB resale 
flats for owner-occupancy.  
The HDB also provides loans to buyers of resale HDB flats. Loan financing prior to 1993 was based 
on 80% of 1984 HDB new flat (posted) prices. As both new and resale prices rose (see Figure 3), 
households purchasing resale flats had to pay an increasingly larger proportion of the price in cash. In 
1993, HDB moved its mortgage financing terms closer to market practice by granting loan financing of 
up to 80% of current valuation or the declared resale price of the flat, whichever is lower. In 1993, the 
CPF Board also began to allow withdrawals of CPF savings to be used to meet interest payments on 
mortgage loans for resale HDB and private housing purchases. Before this, CPF members were allowed 
to withdraw only up to 100% of the value of these properties at the time of purchase.  
Deregulation of the HDB resale market was accompanied by an increase in the number of resale 
HDB transactions. The transaction volume of resale HDB flats increased from fewer than 800 units in 
1979, to 13,000 units in 1987, 60,000 units in 1999, and 31,000 in 2004 (HDB Annual Reports). Resale 
transactions as a proportion of total (new and resale) owner-occupied public housing transactions, were 
three %, 37%, 64% and 68% in 1979, 1987, 1999 and 2004 respectively. The increase in the demand 
for resale flats in the later half of the 1990s was in part due to the introduction of demand side housing 
grants.  
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3.2. CPF housing grants  
In 1994, demand-side subsidies in the form of CPF housing grants for the purchase of resale HDB flats 
were introduced. This represented a shift from total reliance on subsidies tied to new flats to a hybrid 
system of partial reliance on subsidies tied to resale flats. The subsidy is deposited into the CPF account 
of the eligible household when it applies to purchase a resale HDB flat. Under the scheme, the 
government provided the first time applicant household with a grant of $30,000 to purchase a HDB 
resale flat close to either parents’ or married child’s residence. In 1995, the grant was increased to 
$50,000. The government also introduced a more general grant of $40,000 for eligible households that 
purchase a resale flat which does not need to satisfy the criterion of being close to parents’ or married 
child’s residence.  
The shift towards constrained housing grants for the purchase of housing on the secondary market 
was necessary for the following reasons. In the first three decades of the HDB’s existence, annual supply 
of new public housing added substantially to the housing stock particularly in the early 1980s. It was a 
rapid rate that was consistent with high income and population growth in a situation of grave housing 
shortage. The supply policies of the HDB that were suitable under the above circumstances had to be 
reviewed as population growth stabilized and basic housing needs were generally met.  
Singapore’s Housing Policies: Responding to the Challenges of Economic Transitions 
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3.3. HDB upgrading and selective en-bloc redevelopment schemes  
By the late 1980s, a spatial age gradient for HDB estates had become evident. Older estates had been 
built closer to the central business district (CBD) and new towns were built at distances further away 
from the CBD. Also evident was the trend of younger families moving out of older HDB towns as they 
were allocated new flats in outlying new towns. In 1989, the government announced an ambitious long 
term HDB Upgrading Programme to upgrade existing HDB estates. The upgrading programs varied in 
nature and scale (see Table 2) and were subsidized by the government by between 53% and 93% 
depending on flat type (Centre for Liveable Cities and HDB, 2013, p. 20). The Goh government also 
launched the Selective En bloc Redevelopment Scheme (SERS) in 1995 under which older low density 
blocks of HDB flats were demolished and occupants moved to brand new and high density 
developments within the same estate.  
3.4. Housing bubble, the EC Scheme and the Asian financial crisis  
Financial liberalization as well as positive macroeconomic factors resulted in rapidly rising housing 
prices in the early 1990s (see Figure 3). In response to growing concern over the affordability of private 
housing, the government in 1995 introduced the Executive Condominium (EC) scheme, a hybrid public-
private house type. The EC scheme also facilitated the HDB’s withdrawal from the upper-middle-
income housing market, allowing it to discontinue its building of Executive Flats. The EC’s similarity 
with 99-year leasehold private condominiums provided the government with another instrument on the 
supply side to impact private housing prices. The government auctions land for the development of EC 
units to housing developers (private as well as government-linked companies) who are responsible for 
design, construction, pricing, arrangements for financing and estate management. Applicant households 
have to satisfy eligibility conditions and abide by resale and other regulations governing these units.  
Despite an increase in the supply of new HDB housing, the introduction of the EC scheme, and 
increased government land sales for private housing development, housing prices continued to soar 
(with the private housing price index more than tripling between 1990 and 1996). On 15 May 1996, the 
government introduced a package of measures to curb real estate speculation. These included capital 
gains taxes on the sale of any property within three years of purchase, stamp duty on every sale and 
sub-sale of property, limitation of housing loans to 80% of property value, as well as limiting foreigners 
to non S$ denominated housing loans. The HDB also tightened various regulations. In April 1997, HDB 
flat buyers were limited to two loans from the HDB where there had been no limit before. In May 1997, 
the HDB implemented various measures to curb housing demand of upgraders (households applying 
for a second new subsidized flat from the HDB), including lengthening the time period before flat 
lessees are eligible to purchase a second new flat from the HDB from five to ten years, and revising the 
graded resale levy system.  
The immediate effect of these measures was to cool the property market which then entered a slump 
with the onset of the Asian economic crisis in 1997 (see Figure 3). In response to the fall in demand 
that was particularly pronounced in 1998, the government halted land sales and also ended its long 
standing policy of not providing housing subsidies for singles by introducing a $15,000 CPF housing 
grant for eligible single persons to purchase resale 3-room or smaller flats. As housing prices declined 
further, the CPF housing grant was reduced in stages over ten months from January to October 1999 — 
S$500 reduction per month for the Single Citizen housing grant, and S$1000 reduction per month for 
other housing grants.  
Both the private and public housing sectors were faced with a situation of declining prices and unsold 
units. The Monetary Authority of Singapore (2001) estimated unsold housing stock of about 19,800 
units for the private sector. With more than 17,500 unsold new flats in early 2002, the HDB suspended 
its Registration for Flat or queuing system, diverting remaining and new applicants to its built-to-order 
program under which flats are built only when there is sufficient demand for them. In July 2003, in a 
major restructuring exercise, the HDB’s 3000 strong Building and Development Division9 was re-
organized and the HDB Corporation Private Limited (HDB Corp.) set up as a fully-owned subsidiary 
of HDB. In November 2004, HDB divested its 100% shareholding in HDB Corp. to the government’s 
                                                     
9 At the time of restructuring HDB’s staff strength was 8000, including 3000 in the Building and Development Division. The new HDB 
Corp took in about 800 to 1000 staff. Ministry of National Development, Housing and Development Board Press Release, 26 February 2003 
Singapore’s Housing Policies: Responding to the Challenges of Economic Transitions 
 
12 
investment holding company, Temasek Holdings. HDB Corp. was rebranded as Surbana Corporation 
Private Limited and is now partly owned by CapitaLand, a public listed company which is also partly 
owned by Temasek Holdings.  
In his memoirs, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew (who remained in the Cabinet as Minister Mentor to Goh’s 
government) recalled this episode as one in which the government yielded to popular pressure:  
I should have known that it does not pay to yield to popular pressure beyond our 
capacity to deliver. Yet I was party to a similar mistake in the early 1990s. As property 
prices rose, everybody wanted to make a profit on the sale of their old flat and then 
upgrade to a new one, the biggest they could afford. Instead of choking off demand by 
charging a levy to reduce their windfall profits, I agreed that we accommodate the 
voters by increasing the number of flats built. That aggravated the real estate bubble 
and made it more painful when the currency crisis struck in 1997. Had we choked off 
the demand earlier, in 1995, we would have been immensely better off (Lee, 2000, p. 
121).  
4. The Lee Hsien Loong Government, from 2004: Managing Housing Demand and Equity 
Withdrawal to Finance Retirement  
Mr. Lee Hsien Loong became Singapore’s third Prime Minister in August 2004, having served as a 
Member of Parliament since 1984 and a member of the cabinet since 1987. The housing market at the 
start of his term appeared to be stabilizing at the trough of the. property cycle (see Figure 3). The HDB 
had been restructured and downsized. The economy was still recovering from the shock of the SARS 
crisis of 2003. The Asian economic crisis of 1997 and the subsequent fall in property prices had 
demonstrated the risks of housing bubbles, unemployment, and reliance on housing as an asset to 
finance retirement. A rapidly aging population and declines in total fertility rate over the years posed a 
major demographic challenge. Policy attention shifted to ways in which elderly households could 
monetize their housing asset, better targeting of housing grants to benefit lower income households, 
and regulation of the housing market and housing loans.  
In 2005, the government decided to proceed with the development of two casino-based integrated 
resorts. This decision could be said to mark another phase in the economic development of Singapore 
as a global city. On the population front, immigration and foreign worker policies resulted in a rapid 
growth in the number of foreigners in Singapore. But the global financial crisis of 2008–2009 and the 
uncertainties it engendered led the government to hold off increasing housing supply. This subsequently 
resulted in a housing shortage that was acutely felt in 2010 — the year when the two integrated resorts 
opened and the economy rebounded sharply (with real GDP growth of 14.8%).  
Housing price increases in excess of median income growth, a younger generation facing housing 
affordability problems and ineligible or repeatedly unsuccessful in ballots to purchase HDB flats, rising 
income inequality, over-crowding problems on public transport and other facilities, contributed to a 
decline in electoral support for the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP). The PAP’s vote share declined 
from 66.6% at the 2006 election to 60.1% at the 2011 election, with the opposition Workers’ Party 
winning 6 of the 87 seats for elected Members of Parliament. In the post-election period since, Prime 
Minister Lee Hsien Loong has implemented several measures to address the housing problems of 
elderly and lower income households as well as to curb speculative and investment demand for housing.  
4.1. Elderly households: Monetizing housing assets  
The typical household in Singapore has the bulk of its wealth invested in housing. McCarthy et al. 
(2002) show through simulations that the average worker in Singapore is likely to be “asset-rich and 
cash-poor” upon retirement, with 75% of his retirement wealth in housing, provided housing values 
continue to rise in real terms. In contrast, an American elderly household would have only 20% of its 
retirement wealth in housing. This raises the problematic issue of over-concentration of household 
assets in housing resulting in a risky under-diversified portfolio at retirement.  
The government-appointed Economic Review Committee in 2002 arrived at a similar conclusion 
that CPF members were “asset rich and cash-poor” and made recommendations to limit CPF 
withdrawals for housing, and for the government to explore ways for homeowners to monetize their 
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property.10 Agreeing with the committee’s recommendations, the government moved to cap CPF 
withdrawals for housing at 150% of the value of the property, with the cap moving down gradually to 
120% over five years for new private housing loans.  
To address the problem of “Asset Rich and Cash Poor” faced by a segment of the population in their 
old age, the HDB introduced the Lease Buyback Scheme (LBS) in 2009 to allow the low income elderly 
(age 63 or older) living in 3-room or smaller flats to unlock the equity in their homes. The proceeds of 
the part sale will be used to top up their CPF Retirement Accounts and to purchase an annuity plan to 
provide a monthly income for life. The amount of monthly income would be determined by the market 
value of the flat, the length of the remaining lease, amount of outstanding loan on the flat, and the age 
and gender of the elderly owner(s). Under this scheme, HDB buys back the tail lease of the flat, with 
the elderly flat owner retaining a 30-year lease, and provides a bonus (up to S$20,000) in addition to 
the unlocked housing equity. The LBS thus allow the elderly to continue to stay in their flat allowing 
them to age in place. In 2014, the LBS was extended to 4-room flats (Lee, 2014).  
Other monetization options for eligible elderly households include: 
 a Silver Housing Bonus incentive (of up to S$20,000) to sell their current flat and buy a smaller 
flat (right-sizing); 
 buy a studio apartment (sold at elderly-friendly prices for 30-year lease); 
 sublet a room or put their flat up for rental for a steady flow of income.  
                                                     
10
Economic Review Committee: Sub-committee on policies related to taxation, the CPF system, wages and land (2002) 
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4.2. Lower income households: Additional and special housing grants  
With eligibility for HDB new subsidized flats and CPF Housing Grants (of S$40,000) extending to over 
80% of Singapore citizen households, subsidies needed to be better calibrated to household incomes. 
Housing grants which allowed the HDB to better price discriminate based on household incomes 
became a feature of HDB pricing policy.  
Additional Housing Grants were introduced in 2006 (and enhanced in 2007 and 2009) to allow 
families with lower incomes to receive a higher grant amount which could be used for either a new flat 
or a resale flat. The amount of the Additional Housing Grant depends on the average gross monthly 
household income (see Table 3).  
The Special Housing Grant (SHG) was introduced in 2011, enhanced in 2012 and significantly 
expanded in 2013 to help households buy 4-room or smaller new flats in nonmature estates directly 
from the HDB. The amount of SHG depends on the average gross monthly household income (see 
Table 4). A Step-Up Housing Grant (of $15,000) was introduced in 2013 to help families in subsidized 
2-room HDB flats in non-mature estates upgrade to purchase 3-room HDB flats in non-mature estates.  
4.3. Property investors: Curbing housing investment demand  
In the post Global Financial Crisis period, rapid population increase, the low interest rate environment 
and high global liquidity resulting from the very accommodative monetary policies of Central Banks in 
developed economies, led to accelerated price increases of Singapore property (see Figure 3). The 
upward trend in Singapore real estate prices had caused housing to be viewed as an attractive investment 
as compared to other asset classes. In the past two decades, based on price indices, the returns on both 
private housing and HDB resale flat sectors have out-performed the stock exchange’s Straits Times 
Index on a risk-adjusted basis (see Tables 5 and 6). Leverage in real estate and Singapore Dollar 
appreciation further magnify the returns. The superior performance of the HDB sector is based on the 
resale price index alone, and does not include the added benefits of generous subsidies, attractive rental 
yields (6–8%) or imputed income from owner-occupancy. 
The relatively attractive returns on housing assets drew the attention of both local and foreign investors. 
The continuous upward trend in prices has posed difficulties and exerted tremendous pressure on policy 
makers to react with counter-cyclical and cooling measures. Since 2006, the Singapore government has 
announced several consecutive rounds of “cooling” measures to curb demand for housing (see Table 
7). These measures can be viewed as macro-prudential policies to stabilize housing prices, reduce the 
returns for housing investors, and pre-empt a housing bubble from developing. Numerous additional 
transaction taxes for both buyers and sellers have been introduced. These, together with HDB rules and 
CPF housing grants, have resulted in a housing tax-and-subsidy framework which exceeds the income 
tax code in complexity. Table 8 provides a simplified picture of the progressivity of the housing tax-
and-subsidy framework. 
In addition to the numerous demand-curbing measures, the government has been ramping up the supply 
of HDB flats since 2011. While HDB dwelling units under management increased by a mere 23,000 
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units from 2006 to 2011,11 about 25,000 HDB flats were launched for sale in 2011, followed by 27,000 
units in 2012 and 25,000 new flats in 2013. With the increase in supply of both HDB and private housing 
(projected at 196,000 units between 2014 and 2017), the shortage has eased and prices have started to 
decline.12 Housing, though, remains an attractive investment, given the underlying housing framework 
in place, careful regulation of the sector and the long term plans and prospects for Singapore. 
 
                                                     
11 HDB, “Annual Report 2005-2006.” http://www.hdb.gov.sg/fi10/fi10221p.nsf/Attachment/AR0506/$file/index.html; HDB, 
“Annual Report 2010/11”, http://www10.hdb.gov.sg/ebook/ar2011/main.html. 
12 The Straits Times, February 21, 2015 
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5. Concluding Observations  
The success of Singapore’s housing welfare model demonstrates what can be achieved with strategic 
planning to mobilize resources and guide key investments. Complemented by close attention to the 
supply part of the equation as well as policies which created markets over time and accommodated 
private initiatives to fill the gaps, the process has helped Singapore to avoid the worst outcomes of the 
extremes of central planning and unplanned growth. Numerous city governments in former socialist 
countries and in Asia are also major landowners, yet the absence of markets often makes these cities 
inefficient. Those cities can learn much from Singapore’s planning processes, policies to remove real 
estate gridlocks, and the state’s active role in creating markets.  
It can also be seen that the Singapore government has deployed multiple mitigations in parallel to 
reduce the risk of housing becoming a source of financial sector instability. 
 Housing markets are carefully segmented and carefully regulated.  
 The main source of capital for housing finance comes from domestic savings. 
 Price subsidies and housing grants are given to eligible households at the point of purchase 
and not deferred. 
 The HDB relies on government loans to fund mortgage loans. 
 HDB mortgage financing is not subsidized and over time, market share has been shifting 
to commercial banks. 
 The use of compulsory savings lowers default risks. 
 Government housing institutions do not have conflicting missions.  
 The government has control over land and housing supply.  
However, deregulation of housing finance and HDB markets in the 1990s, and supply lagging behind 
population increases recently did contribute to recent episodes of rapid housing price increases. Since 
then, the government has carefully restrained housing credit growth by caps on Loan to Value Ratio, 
Debt Service Ratio, and use of CPF savings for mortgages. It has actively intervened in the housing 
market to curb foreign demand and speculative demand by using HDB regulations, and fiscal and 
macro-prudential tools when price increases threatened to develop into a bubble.  
The transferability of Singapore’s experience needs to be juxtaposed with the local, political and 
social context. A housing provident fund is relatively simple to set up if designed as a savings and 
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payments institution. The more complex institution to replicate is the HDB, in particular its ability to 
comprehensively and effectively intervene to affect many aspects of housing demand, supply and 
prices. Moreover, the tactics on which Singapore relies — compulsory savings, state land ownership, 
and state provision of housing, complemented with an extensive public sector — could easily have 
spawned widespread inefficiency and corruption.  
Singapore’s effective implementation of such planning and regulation is attributable to a network of 
competent and reliable organizations that together provide rich public sector capacity. The quality of 
public administration in Singapore is a result of recruitment based on merit, competitive pay 
benchmarked against private-sector salaries, extensive computerization, and a civil service culture of 
zero tolerance for corruption. Where governments and public sector leadership are weak and/or corrupt, 
such extensive intervention and government control over resource allocation can be potentially abused 
and may carry a higher cost than inaction.  
Despite its rather unique context, there are elements of Singapore’s housing system that can provide 
helpful pointers for housing policy makers generally.  
First, despite the very visible hand of government, markets are very important and creating and/or 
enabling markets to work more efficiently is a very important aspect of housing policy.  
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Second, government involvement can be very helpful for providing timely real estate market 
information, establishing sustainable housing supply regimes and mortgage institutions, and in 
improving the liquidity of housing assets. The short and long term implications of housing subsidies, 
explicit or implicit, supply or demand-side, within the entire system, need to be fully understood.  
Third, retirement savings may be mobilized for housing mortgage payments. However, the CPF 
itself does not make loans to its own members. It is not a good practice for a Housing Provident Fund 
to become a direct lender for housing due to potentially conflicting objectives.  
Fourth, the government regulates the housing markets extensively and has in place an array of 
instruments to curb speculative demand and mitigate the development of asset bubbles.  
Finally, the need for strong legislation and a proper fund governance structure to ensure that the 
interests of provident fund members are adequately protected cannot be overemphasized.  
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